ent1. Long before offering his own neutral monism theory, in which mind and matter are two aspects of some elemental "stuff," Russell discussed similar solutions of previous centuries. In his first book, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (Cambridge 1900), Russell noted
The problem of the relation of Soul and Body was one which occupied much of the attention of Cartesians. Des Cartes' own position on this question, that a direct action of mind on matter is possible, by altering the direction, though not the quantity, of the motion of the animal spirits, was abandoned by his followers for very good reasons. They perceived that, if mind and matter are two substances, they must not be supposed capable of interaction. This led to Occasionalism on the one hand — the theory, namely, that God moves the body on occasion of our volitions — and to the theory of Spinoza on the other hand. In this latter theory, which is more akin to Leibniz's, mind and body are not different substances, but different attributes of one substance, whose modifications form two parallel series. The mind is the idea of the body, and any change in the body is accompanied, though without inter- action, by a corresponding change in its idea, i.e. in the mind.
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