gg2. In The Nature of Truth (Oxford 1906), the idealist
Harold H. Joachim chided Russell and G.E. Moore, both of whom led the 20th century breakaway from British idealism, for using philosophical assumptions that had not been made clear in a systematic exposition though "we are given to understand, in general, that there is such a system, which will emerge (or perhaps has emerged) triumphant from the gulf of criticism which has swallowed all other philosophies." This was written before the Principia Mathematica of Russell and Whitehead and before Wittgenstein's bombshell Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, both of which helped to justify the reactions to idealism known as logical positivist and analytic philosophy.
Years after Joachim's jibe, Russell explained in a 1914 lecture* that he favored a "scientific method" for philosophy. In the past, he said, men were wont to build systems that would stand or fall (in fact, fall) on some error incorporated into the system, as with Kant's assumptions -- now known to have been incorrect -- on space. Modern philosophers should imitate scientists who patiently build upon the work of others, a little here, a little there, in order to continuously improve knowledge with the understanding that perfection of understanding is unlikely. In addition, Russell dismissed ethics as no longer a suitable subject for philosophy.
A need for a "scientific approach" to philosophy was endorsed by a number of 20th Century philosophers. Russell became known as an exponent of "analytic philosophy" while others joined the ranks of or flirted with logical positivism.
In any case, a bone of contention between Russell, and Joachim and the idealists was the nature of truth. Joachim, Bradley and others upheld what Russell styled a "coherence theory" of truth versus his "correspondence theory," which utlimately derives from Aristotle. In a correspondence theory, a truth is a proposition which accords with a fact in the "real world," although Russell was aware of the difficulties of naive realism. Russell argued that monistic coherence theories require a deus ex machina (magic solution). In Russell's telling, the coherence theory is rather similar, in a sense, to pragmatism. In the coherence theory, truth is not relative in the pragmatist way, but relative nevertheless because humans can only glimpse partial truths and are never altogether accurate in what they expound, meaning that evil -- which is an effect of limited knowledge -- is subsumed in the Great Whole. Russell skewers Joachim's reasoning in Russell's "The Monistic Theory of Truth" which appears in his Philosophical Essays (Oxford 1906).
Years after Joachim's jibe, Russell explained in a 1914 lecture* that he favored a "scientific method" for philosophy. In the past, he said, men were wont to build systems that would stand or fall (in fact, fall) on some error incorporated into the system, as with Kant's assumptions -- now known to have been incorrect -- on space. Modern philosophers should imitate scientists who patiently build upon the work of others, a little here, a little there, in order to continuously improve knowledge with the understanding that perfection of understanding is unlikely. In addition, Russell dismissed ethics as no longer a suitable subject for philosophy.
A need for a "scientific approach" to philosophy was endorsed by a number of 20th Century philosophers. Russell became known as an exponent of "analytic philosophy" while others joined the ranks of or flirted with logical positivism.
In any case, a bone of contention between Russell, and Joachim and the idealists was the nature of truth. Joachim, Bradley and others upheld what Russell styled a "coherence theory" of truth versus his "correspondence theory," which utlimately derives from Aristotle. In a correspondence theory, a truth is a proposition which accords with a fact in the "real world," although Russell was aware of the difficulties of naive realism. Russell argued that monistic coherence theories require a deus ex machina (magic solution). In Russell's telling, the coherence theory is rather similar, in a sense, to pragmatism. In the coherence theory, truth is not relative in the pragmatist way, but relative nevertheless because humans can only glimpse partial truths and are never altogether accurate in what they expound, meaning that evil -- which is an effect of limited knowledge -- is subsumed in the Great Whole. Russell skewers Joachim's reasoning in Russell's "The Monistic Theory of Truth" which appears in his Philosophical Essays (Oxford 1906).
* "On Scientific Method in Philosophy," the Herbert Spencer Lecture, 1914. Published in an anthology of essays, Mysticism and Logic by Bertrand Russell (Allen and Unwin 1918).
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