Footnote mnb1

mnb1. In this connection, we have a note by F.H. Bradley, the idealist philosopher:

So far as I know Prof. James never even raised the question whether, and how far, truth is compelled to forgo self-consistency. He seems to have simply assumed that truth must be consistent. But here surely is a problem that should have met him, and that should have even been obvious, from the first.

F.H. Bradley
footnote to "On Truth and Practice"
Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford 1914)

In fairness to James, Bradley may be imputing an absolutist definition of truth to James, though James's conception of truth is clearly relativistic. Still, one cannot deny the impression of inconsistency conveyed by James and other pragmatists. But, then, inconsistency is the lot that philosophers draw when they try to "plumb the mind of God."

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