Footnote ty1

ty1. According to Stewart Candlish and Pierfrancesco Basile, the British philosopher F.H. Bradley

devotes some time to a consideration of issues that arise in the philosophy of nature; although it is evident that he feels the attraction of panpsychism, this is a view he never explicitly endorses. As T.S. Eliot recognized, a Leibnizian strand pervades Bradley’s philosophy, one which finds expression in his doctrine of finite centres of experience. On this view, the Absolute articulates itself in a plurality of lesser sentient wholes, unified psychical individuals of the nature of the human soul. Bradley thus comes close to holding something very like a theory of monads, yet this is incorporated within the general framework of his monistic metaphysics. Interestingly, the doctrine of the Absolute can be seen as a solution to the problem of monadic interaction; like Leibniz’s monads, Bradley’s finite centres are incapable of a direct sharing of content (e.g., they are said to be ‘not directly pervious to each other’; Appearance, p. 464) and of causal interaction; however, they are coordinated to one another in that they are all partial manifestations of the same overarching Reality. A similar attempt at reconciling Absolute Idealism and monadism had been made by Lotze, and in both cases it remains an open question whether this is not pre-established harmony in disguise. What is clear but usually overlooked is that Bradley himself saw Leibnizian monadism as the greatest challenge to his own brand of idealism: ‘Monadism’, he says, ‘on the whole will increase and will add to the difficulties which already exist’ (Appearance, p. 102). He was surely right in this, as later British metaphysicians — such as James Ward, J.M.E. McTaggart, Herbert Wildon Carr, and Alfred North Whitehead — preferred Leibniz over Kant and Hegel as their main source of inspiration.

[From "Francis Herbert Bradley," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/bradley/.]

If we regard Bradley's Absolute as an equivalent to Leibniz's God, we can see how monism and monadology can be regarded as not inconsistent. For Russell, such a mixture was, for most of his career, abhorrent. In his A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (George Allen and Unwin 1900), Russell comments, "A philosophy of substance, we may say generally, should be either a monism or a monadism. A monism is necessarily pantheistic, and a monadism, when it is logical, is necessarily atheistic." (Hence Leibniz's monadism was inconsistent, according to Russell.) Perennial atheist Russell never seems to have adopted anything he would characterize as monadistic, though he was for much of his career a pluralist. Generally, monadism is considered to be pluralistic, though, as we have seen, not always.

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