prw1. Pragmatists appear to have had different levels of understanding of their philosophy. Though Russell skewered James handily, the English earl found more than his match in John Dewey, as we see in Dewey's response to Russell in The Philosophy of John Dewey, Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed. (Library of Living Philosophers, Open Court 1939).
But I cannot say -- not having read much of Dewey or C.S. Pierce or other pragmatists -- who may have understood the following:
As far as I am aware, no one using a scientific or formal logic method is able to prove the existence of other minds, which represents as difficult a problem as proving the existence of God. Though Descartes thought he had proved that other minds exist, his reasoning is generally seen as insufficient. Open to question is Descartes' argument that God forbids solipsism because he would not deceive. Perhaps God has a very good reason to deceive. How can Descartes be so sure?
But, even so, most of us -- excepting possibly a schizophrenic or autistic individual -- take as self-evident the existence of other minds. But that belief is not provable -- helping to make the pragmatist point! That is, we accept the idea that other minds exist on practical grounds. We must do so in order to function with a degree of happiness in this our world; we need those others to be at least somewhat distinct from ourselves. We act on this belief as a truth, and so it is a truth, pragmatists might say. Interestingly, Russell on a number of occasions mentions the point that no one really believes in solipsism -- without ever noticing his observation's relation to pragmatism.
Yet, I believe, what James was driving at was relativity of religious belief. My religious truth is as true as yours. I suppose that his belief that the universe(?) is pluralistic can be used to justify the notion that absolute truth does not exist. But can we be sure that God does not reveal, amid the World's Cavalcade of Religions, some narrow alley as the path to be taken?
But I cannot say -- not having read much of Dewey or C.S. Pierce or other pragmatists -- who may have understood the following:
As far as I am aware, no one using a scientific or formal logic method is able to prove the existence of other minds, which represents as difficult a problem as proving the existence of God. Though Descartes thought he had proved that other minds exist, his reasoning is generally seen as insufficient. Open to question is Descartes' argument that God forbids solipsism because he would not deceive. Perhaps God has a very good reason to deceive. How can Descartes be so sure?
But, even so, most of us -- excepting possibly a schizophrenic or autistic individual -- take as self-evident the existence of other minds. But that belief is not provable -- helping to make the pragmatist point! That is, we accept the idea that other minds exist on practical grounds. We must do so in order to function with a degree of happiness in this our world; we need those others to be at least somewhat distinct from ourselves. We act on this belief as a truth, and so it is a truth, pragmatists might say. Interestingly, Russell on a number of occasions mentions the point that no one really believes in solipsism -- without ever noticing his observation's relation to pragmatism.
Yet, I believe, what James was driving at was relativity of religious belief. My religious truth is as true as yours. I suppose that his belief that the universe(?) is pluralistic can be used to justify the notion that absolute truth does not exist. But can we be sure that God does not reveal, amid the World's Cavalcade of Religions, some narrow alley as the path to be taken?
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