hg1. Russell disliked the thesis of James and other pragmatists that, in particular, theological truths are contingent on the will to believe and are a species of good. At issue was James's notion that Pascal's wager necessitates that truth is a human process and that, in particular, humans make theological truths, which ought to be believed as their contradiction leaves little hope.
Against Russell, who was (usually) also a pluralist, I suggest that James's view of truth is intertwined with his much-avowed pluralism. In pluralism, not everything coheres. Some things clash in a random jumble, James believed. But in that case, overarching truths are not so overarching. Hence, humans must arrive at such truths in a process that serves their purpose. If, say, two independent components of the cosmos do not cohere, then there would seem to be no one truth that would adequately report on both.
James's pluralism stemmed from his belief that the God of humanity, though powerful, was not omnipotent because he sought human aid in the battle against evil.
In any case, my extensive reading of Russell has shown no awareness of the implied link between pluralism and pragmatism. On the other hand, I have read only one of James's philosophy tracts -- the one titled Pluralism -- and I have read nothing by pragmatists C.S. Pierce or John Dewey and so I am uninformed as to how aware any of them were of that apparent linkage.
In his book, Pragmatism, a new name for some old ways of thinking (Longmans Green 1907), James wrote that "truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it." James adds,
Against Russell, who was (usually) also a pluralist, I suggest that James's view of truth is intertwined with his much-avowed pluralism. In pluralism, not everything coheres. Some things clash in a random jumble, James believed. But in that case, overarching truths are not so overarching. Hence, humans must arrive at such truths in a process that serves their purpose. If, say, two independent components of the cosmos do not cohere, then there would seem to be no one truth that would adequately report on both.
James's pluralism stemmed from his belief that the God of humanity, though powerful, was not omnipotent because he sought human aid in the battle against evil.
In any case, my extensive reading of Russell has shown no awareness of the implied link between pluralism and pragmatism. On the other hand, I have read only one of James's philosophy tracts -- the one titled Pluralism -- and I have read nothing by pragmatists C.S. Pierce or John Dewey and so I am uninformed as to how aware any of them were of that apparent linkage.
In his book, Pragmatism, a new name for some old ways of thinking (Longmans Green 1907), James wrote that "truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it." James adds,
The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons. Surely you must admit this, that if there were NO good for life in true ideas, or if the knowledge of them were positively disadvantageous and false ideas the only useful ones, then the current notion that truth is divine and precious, and its pursuit a duty, could never have grown up or become a dogma. In a world like that, our duty would be to shun truth, rather. But in this world, just as certain foods are not only agreeable to our taste, but good for our teeth, our stomach and our tissues; so certain ideas are not only agreeable to think about, or agreeable as supporting other ideas that we are fond of, but they are also helpful in life's practical struggles. If there be any life that it is really better we should lead, and if there be any idea which, if believed in, would help us to lead that life, then it would be really better for us to believe in that idea, unless, indeed, belief in it incidentally clashed with other greater vital benefits.Please see Russell's often trenchant examination of pragmatism in his articles "Pragmatism" (Edinburgh Review 1909) and "William James's Conception of Truth" (Albany Review 1908), which both appear in Philosophical Essays. James replies in his The Meaning of Truth (Longmans 1909) that Russell had portrayed his position too simplistically and in one case had repeated a slander. James gives the following situation as an example of pragmatism: James might believe that the Shakespearean plays had indeed been written by Shakespeare whereas another might believe that Francis Bacon was the author. The problem is that traditionalists like Russell think that truth must be absolute, argues James. (That a planar triangle always has three angles that sum to two right angles would seem to be an indisputable truth. Yet, on James's behalf, one can note that in Riemannian geometry this "fact" is often false.)
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